#### Why Did Risk Analysis Fail?

#### **Douglas A. Samuelson** InfoLogix, Inc.

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samuelsondoug@yahoo.com



#### Did Risk Analyses Fail?

Financial crisis: "Kill All the Quants"
Models underrated growing risk
Managers didn't believe models
Some deliberate misstatement
Some genuine modeling errors
Questionable assessment of predictions



#### **Did Risk Analyses Fail?**

BP Spill: "Why didn't we know?" Gov't. ignored pattern of risky practice • Gov't. lacked in-house expertise BP underestimated risks and under-prepared Some genuine modeling errors Questionable assessment of predictions

#### Did Risk Analyses Fail?

- Katrina: "Who should have acted?"
- Gov't. postponed needed repairs to levees
- ♦ Gov't. shifted expertise to other risks
- Louisiana and New Orleans underestimated risks and under-prepared
- Serious modeling error: understated risk from Lake Pontchartrain side of the city
- Questionable assessment of predictions

#### **Unduly Limiting Assumptions**

Financial crisis: credit scores based on recent experience, which saw no downturns
In a crisis, usually uncorrelated behaviors become correlated (e.g. urgent selling)
BP: Is the geologic structure unusual here?
Katrina: How do people without cars evacuate after the buses stop running?



- Estimating oil spill risks from tankers: analyst wanted data from entire distribution, including very small spills
- Question: how much do small spills tell you about large spills?
- Response: "You don't understand statistics"

Underestimating Probabilities and Effects of Rare Events

- Unknown rare events may be overlooked entirely
- Some locations have had three or four "hundred-year floods" in past century
- Confidence intervals overstate precision when rare events are not included
- Expert judgments are often uncalibrated

#### **Excessive Trust in Markets**

- FNMA: CEO believed market price, not model's
- Markets are myopic, tend not to give sufficient weight to sketchy information
- Assumption of equal information among parties may not hold -- hard to pin down

## Over-Specialization, Resistance Among Disciplines

- FNMA: CEO trusted conventional economics over risk models
- BP: economists, geologists, risk analysts tend not to talk, or to talk past each other
- Early credit scoring: resistance to letting models override loan officers' judgment
- FICO first tried medical risk: no takers

## Insufficient Empiricism About Quantitative Methods

- D. W. Hubbard survey: several popular techniques increase comfort far more than they improve actual results
- Examples he cites: balanced scorecards, AHP
- We should insist on assessing how accurate our models' predictions were

# Data Problems By Design

Are the data required available and good? (Example: relying on ER diagnostic codes)
Enough effort spent on data quality?
Whose responsibility?
Are key data series available enough ahead of time to make forecasts ?

# Data Needs Poorly Addressed

Modeling may indicate need for more data Additional data collection rarely done Tend to collect more of the kinds of data we can get easily, already have Should be guided by Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI): how much better could we do if we had this measurement precisely?

## **Exacerbating Factor: Over-Specialization**

- Scott Page: "Diversity trumps ability" (from agent-based simulation of traders)
- We all have our blind spots, both as individuals and as disciplines / professions
- Example: Forrester / Meadows World III model omitted all price effects, so economists simply dismissed it; geologists dismiss econometric models that assume prices dominate

# **Suggested Corrective Action For Blind Spots**

Have design and findings checked by:
Scenario experts
Domain experts
Modelers
Users

(NRC / NAS, Behavioral Modeling and Simulation)

## Another "Feel-Good but..." Technique: Accreditation

- By definition, accreditation means that a model can yield no more surprises -- every result is supported by external sources
- Theorem: A model that can yield no more surprises is of no further analytical use
- Can be a way for opponents to stifle all models
- Often dealt with by stacking the committee, thereby defeating the purpose

#### **Overly Powerful Assumptions**

 System Dynamics: feedback loops structure essentially determines model behavior
 Advantage: insensitive to data problems
 Disadvantage: insensitive to data, period!
 Useful for exploring relationships, very difficult to calibrate predictions

## **Overly Powerful Assumptions**

- Agent-Based Simulation: agent structure essentially determines model behavior
- Many of the same issues as System Dynamics
- Useful for exploring relationships, very difficult to calibrate predictions
- Story-telling" output is most useful



# **Complexity Validation Theorem**

The more closely a model approximates the complexity of reality, the harder it becomes to distinguish genuine rare events from programming deficiencies.

(Proof follows "Scott Effect" reasoning)

#### **Conservation of Uncertainty**

The more an analyst thinks he knows about a situation, the more evidence it takes to convince him to change his assessment.

Rather than reducing uncertainty, modeling relocates uncertainty from the calculations to the assumptions.



## Helpful Methods

- Exploratory methods (SD, ABS) coupled with SME reviews, other more data-driven approaches
- Wargaming
- Better pattern recognition, especially supervised data mining, spatial-temporal

## Some Useful Ideas

Pay attention to non-random missing (examples: leaving "employer" blank on a consumer credit application, country that stops keeping good demographic statistics)
Understand process behind apparent data anomalies (example: discontinuities in manpower modeling are often the events)

# **Additional Useful Ideas**

- Calculate value of expending additional resources to get more data, and allocate accordingly (EVPI)
- Collect data that would most reduce your uncertainty about critical consequences
- Collect data about facts, not perceptions
- Integrate qualitative and quantitative

## The Basis of Good Analysis

Analysis rests on a tripod:

- Technique
- Subject matter knowledge
- Just plain good thinking

No two are a good substitute for the third.

#### A War Game Example

- Yellow: 1000 land-based ICBMs, 20 missile submarines, 300,000-man army
- Purple: 1000 land-based ICBMs, 900,000man army
- Between them is a neutral area they covet
  ICBMs have 95% kill probability
  Who wants to start a war?



#### War Game Example: Scenario 1

 Guaranteed enforceable no-first-use plan: limit throw weights of ICBMs so that it would take two to kill one

Do both parties like this plan?

#### War Game Example: Scenario 2

#### Give Purple 5000 ICBMs

- Give Yellow 1000 interceptors that can shoot down an incoming ICBM with 80% probability
- Interceptors can choose their targets after incoming missiles' targets are apparent
- Who likes this plan?

## **Findings**

 Powerful method to illuminate issues and highlight previously unsuspected outcomes Critically dependent on quality of scenario, diversity and skill of players Tends to make quantitative methods seem less relevant and useful Hard to identify and estimate remaining unknown risks

#### **Conclusions**

- Many modeling methods understate risks because of data problems, bad assumptions
- Exploratory methods can help identify lowprobability, high-consequence threats to include in consideration
- Cross-cutting multidisciplinary analyses help find blind spots and reduce their effect
   Methodology is no substitute for thinking!